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Abstract: With the fusion of social networks and location-based 
services, location sharing is one of the most important services in 
mobile online social networks (mOSNs). In location-sharing 
services, users have to provide their location information to service 
provider. However, location information is sensitive to users, which 
may cause a privacy-preserving issue needs to be solved. In the 
existing research, location-sharing services, such as friends’ query, 
does not consider the attacks from friends. In fact, a user may not 
trust all of his/her friends, so just a part of his/her friends will be 
allowed to obtain the user’s location information. In addition, users’ 
location privacy and social network privacy should be guaranteed. 
In order to solve the above problems, we propose a new architecture 
and a new scheme called User-Defined Privacy Location-Sharing 
(UDPLS) system for mOSNs. In our scheme, the query time is 
almost irrelevant to the number of friends. We also evaluate the 
performance and validate the correctness of our proposed algorithm 
through extensive simulations. 
Key words: Location privacy; Mobile online social networks; 
Friend attacks; Anonymity; Location sharing 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
    Location-based services employ GPS, WLAN, Cellular 
network technologies to obtain location information of the 
mobile terminal, and to provide location-based services to 
the mobile terminal through the wireless network [1]. Due to 
the development of Internet technology, the well-known 
dominant mOSNs such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter have 
been growing rapidly in both of size and popularity. In these 
traditional online social networks, users can conveniently 
exchange information, and share blog, video, images, etc. 
   When mOSNs and location-based services are integrated 
together, many location-based services such as near friends’ 
query, “check-in”, and simple location sharing can be 
provided by mOSNs. For example, users can get some 
preferential service through “check-in” services. In addition, 
users can query their friends and strangers which close to the 
current position and obtain their location information. After 
Facebook integrated with location-based services, they 
attract a large number of users from starting operations, and 
the number of users is still growing rapidly [2]. 
Location-based service (LBS) is one of the most important 
components in mOSNs, which provides services to users 
based on the geographical position of the mobile device. 
With mobility and ever-present Internet connectivity of the 
world, a great amount of users take the advantage of LBS to 
query information based on their location. In LBS, users can 
query the near hospitals, supermarkets, bars and so on, which 
provides users much convenience. 
   As LBSs and mOSNs grow in popularity, many new 
services are spawned, such as friends and travel routes 
recommendation. However, there are also some challenges 
need to be solved. Location information is one of the most 
sensitive privacies to users, and thus it is very valuable. For 
example, if mOSNs collect users’ much location information, 
they may provide it to third parties since the commercial 
purpose, which will leak users’ location privacy. In addition, 
much sensitive information can be inferred from location 
information, when more sophisticated analysis is employed. 
For example, attackers may deduce that the user’s physical 
health from the data of in hospital. Also, attackers may infer 
that a user is a drunkard, if the user frequently query the 
nearest bars. 
It is important that keep personal location information 
from being obtained by malicious attackers. Location 
privacy includes published time of location information, the 
spatial location and location service request content. 
Especially, spatial location is most concerned issue of 
location privacy in mOSNs. Users’ geographical location 
information mainly relate to the spatial location, which is one 
of the main concern of this paper. 
In mOSNs, the query from friend or stranger in the 
user-specified range is a typical application of location 
sharing services. Location-based social networking systems 
with location sharing services rely on a central server that can 
obtain all users’ detail movement profile, which raises 
privacy concerns [3-5]. If users’ location privacy is not well 
protected, users are likely to reject to use the location sharing 
services [6]. Therefore, the development of location sharing 
services will face many challenges. 
Recently, in mONSs, several methods [7-11] have been 
proposed to protect users’ location privacy in friends’ and 
strangers’ queries in the user-specified distance. In the 
research of [7-10], user’s location privacy is protected by 
adding dummy identities. The location service provider can’t 
obtain complete information of users’ identities and location. 
In Ref. [11], a architecture with multiple location servers is 
proposed. The user’s friend set in each friend’s query 
submitted to the location servers is divided into multiple 
  
subsets by the social network server randomly. Query results 
are sent to social servers through encryption and digital 
signatures, so social networking server cannot obtain 
location information of the user. However, theses solutions 
do not consider the attacks from friends. The user may not 
trust all of his/all friends, and thus may not want to share 
location with all of his/her friends. 
Based on the reviews mentioned above, in this work, we 
propose a new solution to achieve user-defined location 
privacy and social network privacy. This solution allows user 
to choose whether to provide accurate position in friends’ 
query or share location with a part of his/her friends.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 gives the 
preliminaries and problem statements. Section 4 presents 
descriptions on motivation, system model and the specific 
implementation. Section 5 gives detailed descriptions on 
security analysis of our UPLS scheme. The simulation 
results are given in Section 6. Section 7 presents the research 
contributions and discussion. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we survey the privacy-preserving techniques 
for location-based services and location sharing services. 
2.1 Location-based Services 
K-anonymity is one of the key technologies to solve the 
current problem of location privacy in LBS, which can 
ensure that the probability of user’s real position recognized 
by attacker is at most 1/k. Spatio-temporal anonymous 
method [12-14] is one of the means of achieving k 
anonymity. In the spatio-temporal anonymous method, a 
trusted third party called central location anonymous server 
[15-17] is deployed between users and LBS servers. User’s 
location privacy is protected by central location anonymous 
server. 
However, the location privacy-preserving techniques 
mentioned above for LBS have several drawbacks. For 
example, it requires a fully-trusted third party, offering 
limited privacy guarantees, and is prone to single point of 
failure. If too many users simultaneously request location 
anonymity, which will lead to performances bottlenecks of 
the central location anonymous server, a crash may occur. In 
addition, once an attacker controls the central location 
anonymous server, the attacker will get all users’ detail 
location information, and thus users’ privacy will also be 
subsequently exposed.  
Fake location method [18-21] is proposed to address the 
issues mentioned above. In the fake location method, users 
directly communicate with LBS server without a trusted third 
party, which mainly rely on users’ terminal to achieve 
location privacy. In addition to the true location of user, the 
fake location method is to find other k-1 fake locations for 
the user. And then the k locations will be sent simultaneously 
to LBS server. 
In addition, policy-based and encryption methods are then 
proposed. In [22], users firstly identify a query area that 
includes the user’s true location. Query area is divided into 
grid cells with equal size. User encrypts information of 
queried area and gird configuration, and encrypts the space 
intersecting with each grid cell as an encrypted identifier. All 
points of interest within the specified range will be 
discovered by location-based server. Query results matching 
user’s true location will be sent to users. 
2.2 Location Sharing Services 
Restricting location sharing to established social relations 
makes a large class of mobile social applications, such as 
Serendipity [23]. Previous work [24-25, 27] discussed the 
problem of sharing locations between established relations in 
a privacy-preserving way. Novak et al. proposed a scheme 
allowing two parties to share location information [26]. For 
example, when a user named Alice queries the location of the 
other user named Bob, homomorphic encryption is used by 
the system to detect whether location of Alice matches Bob’s 
access policy. This strategy does not rely on any trusted third 
party server. A solution solving the problem of k nearest 
neighbor queries is proposed in Ref. [28]. A client-server 
solution [29] for proximity detection is based on encryption 
and multi-level partitions of spatial domain. Vicinity region 
proposed in [29] is a region where the solution will notify a 
user if any friend of users enter the user’s specified area. All 
work mentioned above just address the issue of location 
sharing with user’s friends. The authors in [30] proposed a 
system called SmokeScreen, which allow users to share their 
location with both friends and strangers. 
 In research [7] and [11], both location server and social 
network server assumed to be untrusted. Location based 
service provider may unauthorized obtain the user’s 
complete social relations, when users share location 
information among trusted social relations. However, 
different dynamic pseudonyms each query cannot protect 
users’ social network privacy on location server, because the 
same social network may be related to the same user. In order 
to address the issue mentioned above, a system with multiple 
location servers is proposed in Ref. [11].  
Each location server can only obtain a portion of user’s 
friends. It is noteworthy that the query time increases linearly 
with the number of friends and strangers. However, all of the 
researches mentioned above do not consider the attacks from 
friends. The user may not prefer their friends to know his/her 
precise location or just would like to share location with a 
part of his/her friends. 
3. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
3.1 The Basic Concepts and Definitions 
In this subsection, we explain the main concepts and 
definitions used in this work. Key notations used in this 
section are summarized in Table 1. 
Total users: It refers to all of users within user-specified 
distance, where any user meets condition: dis((x, y),(xi, yi))≤l. 
The number of total users is called the total number of users. 
Effective users: Any user in total users meeting the 
condition of dis((x, y), (xi, yi))≤difi is called effective user.  
  
Access control: Access control mentioned in this paper 
includes distance control and identity control. Distance 
control refers to that query users who specify query distance 
and queried distance. Identity control refers to that users can 
specify a part of his/her friends to inquiry their location 
information. 
Table 1 Summary of Key Notations 
Notation Description 
ID User’s social network identifier. 
pidID The pseudonym of user ID. 
l Distance threshold in friends’ location query. 
difID Friend-case threshold distance of user ID . 
d Distance threshold in strangers’ location query. 
SID Stranger-case threshold distance of user ID . 
(PK, SK) 
User’s public key and secret key for social 
network registration. 
(xID, yID) User’s real location. 
dis((.,.)) A function for returning distance between inputs. 
min(.,.) A function to calculate the minimum value. 
3.2 RSA Digital Signature  
RSA is a typical asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric 
encryption algorithm requires two key parts: a public key and 
a private key. If the public key is used to encrypt data, only 
the corresponding private key can decrypt; if the private key 
is used to encrypt data, only the corresponding public key 
can decrypt. RSA digital signature includes following three 
main steps:  
(1) Key Pair Generation 
Select two large prime numbers p and q. Assume the 
number M = p×q and ( )M = (p-1) ×(q-1). Select a number 
e, which satisfy the Equation (1). 
( , ( )) 1, 1 ( )gcd e M e M                     (1) 
Function gcd (.,.) returns the maximum common divisor of 
inputs. 
And we define the number d as in Equation (2). 
1( ( ( )))d e mod M                               (2) 
Based on Equations (1) and (2), two numbers e and d have 
been computed. We define (e, M) as the public key, and (d, M) 
as the private key. 
(2) Message encryption and signature 
We use n to denote the plaintext, and then the cryptograph 
can be implemented by the following formula:  
  ( )
ec n mod M       
                           (3) 
where the message c is cryptograph, and (n, c) used to denote 
a signature and will be sent for authorizing. 
(3) Message decryption and authentication 
After receiving a signature, the cryptograph c can be 
decrypted by the following formula: 
( )dm c mod M                               (4) 
where m is the deciphered information of c. If m is same as 
original message n, it will be accepted as a valid signature. 
Otherwise, it will be recognized as an invalid signature. 
3.3 Pseudonym Generation 
In this work, we assume that different pseudonyms have 
different IDs, i.e., one-to-one mapping relationship must be 
established between ID and pseudonym. 
Mapping rule randomly generates a number by using 
linear congruential method for ensuring the uniqueness of 
pseudonym. We call the random number as pseudorandom 
number in this paper. 
Random number is generated by the following recursive 
formula: 
1 ( )( )j jN A N B mod M                      (5) 
where, A, B, and M are constants, and they satisfy the 
following constraints: 






 , ( ( 1)) 0P mod A                (7) 
where,  
U3={ai| M(mod ai)=0,gcd(ai,bi)=1, ai∈Z, ai<M, bi∈Z,bi<ai}. 
( 4) 0M mod  , ( -1)( 4)=0A mod              (8)                                          
 
0, ,A M B M N M                                   (9) 
0, 0A B                                                     (10) 
( ) 1j
j
O N                                                 (11) 
Constraints (5)-(10) are to ensure correctly generating 
random numbers according to linear congruential method. 
Constraint (11) is used to ensure that each random number is 
unique, which means that the pseudonyms are unique. 
3.4 Friends Addition and Removal 
Social network server manages user’s social relationship, 
in the form of social network graph G=(V, E). V is a set of 
identity vertices and E is a set of edges. If two identity 
vertices are connected by an edge, the corresponding users 
are friends. 
As shown in the Figure 1, User 1 has friends including 
User 2, User 3, and User 4. User 2 has friends including User 
1 and User 5. This social network graph shows all users’ 
complete social networks.  
When a user adds or removes friends from his/her social 
network, the social network graph will be updated. For 
  
example, if User 1 adds User 5 to his/her social network, an 
edge connecting User1 and User 5 will be added in Figure 1. 
If User 1 removes User 2 from his/her social network, the 
edge connecting User 1 and User 2 will be removed. Thus, 
social network server dynamically updates all users’ social 
networks. In location-sharing services, user’s friends who 
have been removed from social network cannot share 
location information with the user. However, the newly 








Fig. 1 An example of social network graph 
3.5 Threat Model 
Location Server (LS) and Social Network Server (SNS) 
are both assumed to be “honest-but-curious”, which means 
that they will perform users’ query scheme and send query 
results to users correctly, but they may try to obtain as much 
sensitive information of users as possible. 
Users are assumed to be dishonest. Since they try to get as 
much unauthorized information as possible and may leak 
location privacy to attackers. 
LS and SNS cannot collude together to obtain users 
sensitive information. Information leaks during transmission 
such as eavesdropping is beyond the scope of this paper yet. 
3.6 Security Goals 
In this work, the security goals include the following three 
areas for the location-sharing system in online mobile social 
networks: i) SNS is prevented from obtaining users’ location 
information; ii) The users’ location information cannot be 
accessed by such friends and strangers if their access control 
does not match the users’ access control; iii) LS is prevented 
from getting users’ social network information. 
4.  MOTIVATION AND SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we give descriptions on the motivation and a 
new system model to solve our researched problem. 
4.1 Motivation 
The authors in [11] had proposed the framework of 
multiple location servers to prevent the location server from 
obtaining the users’ complete information of social 
networks. However, the problems below are not considered 
in [11].  
(1) Location servers may obtain users’ historical location 
information because user’s fake identifier includes his/her 
real identifier which is a constant; 
(2) The whole set of friends of users may be obtained by 
location servers if all location servers collude, although the 
list of user’s friends has been divided into multiple parts;  
(3) Policy of multiple location servers uses symmetric 
encryption algorithm and digital signature algorithm in the 
query processing. The overhead of query time is almost 
proportional to the number of friends, which consumes much 
time due to a large number of friends; 
(4) Multiple location servers store the same information, 
which results in wasting of resources; 
(5) The user may want to share their location with part of 
friends matching his/her access control or just want their 
identity information to be queried in certain situations. 
Taking all of the above into account, we propose a new 
architecture and a new scheme namely User-Defined Privacy 
Location-Sharing system (UDPLS) in this work. 
4.2 System Model 
The system model for privacy preserving is composed of 
three parts: the entity of users, the entity of online social 











Fig. 2 System model for privacy preserving 
The entity of users, carrying a mobile terminal, can share 
their location with his/her friends, which means that they can 
execute friends’ query within the user-specified distance. 
Users can communicate with online social network server 
and location server. Each user has a unique social identity in 
online social network server. 
   The entity of online Social Network Server (SNS) manages 
user’s profiles, friend list and information for authentication. 
It also provides online social network service to users based 
on the given identity-based information. 
   The entity of Location Server (LS) stores all users’ 
pseudonyms and corresponding location information in order 
to provide location-related services. 
As shown in Figure 2, the proposed framework for privacy 
protection can be divided into three steps: user registration, 
location update and request submission. 
  
1) User Registration 
User registration includes the registration at SNS and 
registration at LS. 
Registration at SNS: Social network server stores the 
user’s ID and corresponding friend set. We assume that 
user’s social network database in the form of {ID, pid, G, PK} 
is maintained by SNS, where G=(V, E), as defined in Section 
3.4. In each registration on social network server, user 
generates a key pair (pk, sk), where pk is the public key, sk is 
the private key. Users send identity and authentication 
information to the social network server in the form of {ID, ts, 
SigSKID (ID, ts), pk}, where SigSKID (ID, ts) denotes a 
signature generated with user’s secret key SKID over the 
timestamp ts. Then social network server needs to find the 
same ID, and corresponding public key PKID that user has 
registered before. And then social network server verifies the 
correctness of the signature SigSKID (ID, ts) with PKID. If the 
user is valid, then the SNS randomly generates a pseudonym 
pid for uniquely identifying the user. Each time a user 
register at social network server, SNS will randomly 
generate a pseudonym for the user to prevent the LS to obtain 
user’s real identity. Finally, the social network server sends 
pid to the user. At the same time, social network server also 
sends information to the LS in form of (pid, pk). 
Registration at LS: We assume that a location database in 
the form of {(pid, pk, (x,y), difID, sID)} is kept by LS. After 
receiving pid, the user sends the information to the LS, in the 
form of {pid, ts, Sigsk (pid,ts), (x,y), difID, sID}, where Sigsk 
(pid,ts)  is a signature generated with user’s secret key sk 
over the timestamp ts. LS then uses the user’s public key pk 
to verify the correctness of the signature.  
2) Location update 
   When a user’s location changes, a new pseudonym pid’ 
will be assigned to the user by social network server. The 
user’s pseudonym pid’ will be updated in the social network 
server. And the user will regenerate a key pair (pk’, sk’) for 
registration at location server. User sends information to 
social network in the form of {ID, ts, SigSKID (ID,ts), pk’}. If 
SNS verifies that the user is valid, it will send pid’ to the user, 
and send (pid’, pk’) to LS. Then the user sends the 
information to the LS, in the form of {pid’, Sigsk’ (pid’,ts), (x, 
y), difID, sID}, where (x, y) is the user’s current location. Once 
LS verifies that the user is a valid user with the public key 
pk’, the user’s location (x, y) and (difID, sID) will be updated. 
3) Request submission 
Request submission includes friends’ query request 
submission and strangers’ query request submission. 
    Friends’ location query request submission: User sends 
friends’ query to the social network server, in the form of 
(ID, Y/N/ <friends-set>), and also sends information to LS, 
in the form of (pid, l, Y/N). Where N represents that only the 
user’s ID can be obtained by the users who meet the user’s 
access policy; Y represents all users who meet the user’s 
access policy can obtain the user’s ID and location 
information. If <friends-set> is not empty, indicating that the 
user is only prefer to share location information with 
specified friends who meet the user’s access policy in 
<friends-set>.  
After receiving the inquiry request, LS checks all of 
pseudonym within the distance l. Then LS executes access 
control based on these users’ friend-case threshold of 
distance. Assume a pseudonym set is PID, and PID= {pid1,…, 
pidi,…,pidn}. All pseudonyms in PID must meet the 
following condition: 
    , , , ( , )i i idis x y x y min l dif  
Users in PID who have sent N to location server will be put 
into set PID1, otherwise set PID2, where PID1= {pid11,…, 
pid1i,…,pid1n}, and PID2={pid21,…,pid2i,…,pid2n}. LS sends 
PID1 to the user, and sends PID2 and corresponding location 
information to the user, in the form of {(pid21, (x21,y21)),…, 
(pid2i, (x2i,y2i)),…, (pid2n, (x2n,y2n)). 
Assume that a user’s friend set is represented by set 
Friend-Set, and thus Friend-Set = {(ID1,pid1),…,(IDi, 
pidi),…, (IDn,pidn)}. If location information of friends in 
Friend-Set is allowed to access by the user, these friends’ ID 
and corresponding pseudonyms will be added to the 
collection Friend-Set’. 
Assume Friend-Set’= {(ID1’, pid1’), …,(IDi’, pidi’), …, 
(IDn’, pidn’)}. Social network server sends Friends-set’ to the 
user. The user then matches the received information from 
location server and social network server. And then the query 
results can be obtained by the user. The matching process can 
be described as: For any pseudonym pidi belonging to PID1, 
if pidiFriend-Set’, the user obtains the corresponding IDi; 
for any pseudonym pidi  belonging to PID2, if pidi 
Friend-Set’, the user obtains the corresponding IDi and 
location information (xi, yi). 
Strangers’ location query request submission: User 
sends strangers query request to social network server, as 
well sends information to LS in the form of (pid, d, s). 
Assume a pseudonym set is PID, and PID={pid1,…, 
pidi,…,pidn}. All pseudonyms in PID must meet the 
following condition: 
    , , , ( , )i i idis x y x y min d s  
   Since location information of pseudonyms is added into 
PID, we update the PID as {(pid1, (x1,y1)),…,(pidi, (xi, yi)) ,…, 
(pidn, (xn,yn))}. And LS directly sends PID to the user. 
Assume another pseudonym set is PID’, any pseudonym in 
PID’ is randomly selected by LS and is different from that in 
PID. PID’ is added to PID for updating PID. Then the 
updated PID is sent to social network server. Social network 
server cannot determine which pseudonym matches the 
user’s access policy, thus privacy protection is enhanced. 
After receiving PID’, social network server removes 
pseudonyms that belong to the friends’ pseudonym of the 
user from PID’. Thus, PID’ is updated to pseudonym set 
PID1. Social network server sends PID1 and corresponding 
ID to the user, in the form of {(ID1, pid1), …, (IDi, pidi), …, 
(IDn, pidn)}. Here we denote the set PID2 as PID2 = {(ID1, 
pid1), …, (IDi, pidi), …, (IDn, pidn). 
  
   The user matches the received information from location 
server and social network server. For any pseudonym pidi 
belonging to PID, if pidi  PID2, the user obtains the 
corresponding IDi and location information (xi, yi). 
4.3 Algorithm for Friends’ Location Query 
The execution of friends’ query in UDPLS has shown 
above. We give the detailed pseudo code of algorithm in the 
Figure 3. 
 
Algorithm 1:  Friends’ location query  
Input:1. The user’s location, (x, y); 
           2. The user’s query distance, l. 
Output: Friends’ location and ID. 
1: for any pseudonym k within l 
2:      if (dis((x, y),(xk, yk)) <= min(l, difk)) 
3:         Add k to set U; 
4:     end if 
5: end for 
6: for any pseudonym k in U 
7:     if (k have sent N to LS)  
8:         Add k to set U1; 
9:     else 
10:        Add k to set U2;  
11:   end if 
12: end for 
13: for any pseudonym k in U2 
14:     Add the location information (xk, yk) to U2; 
15: end for 
16: for any pseudonym k in U 
17:     if (k is a pseudonym of the user’s friends) 
18:        Add k and its ID to set U3; 
19:     end if 
20: end for 
21: for any pseudonym k in U1 
22:     if (k in U3) 
23:        Add the ID to result; 
24: end for 
25: for any pseudonym k in U2 
26:      if (k in U3) 
27:        Add the ID and (xk, yk) to result; 
28:     end if 
29: end for 
30: return result 
Fig.3 Algorithm for friends’ location query in UDPLS 
4.4 Algorithm for Strangers’ Location Query  
    The process of strangers’ query has been described in 
previous section. In this subsection, we give the detailed 
pseudo code of algorithm in the Figure 4. 
 
Algorithm 2:  Strangers’ location query  
Input: 1. The user’s location, (x, y); 
            2. The user’s query distance, d. 
Output: strangers’ location and ID. 
1:  for any pseudonym k within d 
2:      if (dis((x, y),(xk, yk)) <= min(d, sk)) 
3:        Add k and (xk, yk) to set U; 
4:        Add k to set U1; 
5:     end if 
6:  end for 
7:  Randomly add some other pseudonyms to U1;   
8:  for any pseudonym k in U1 
9:      if (k is not a pseudonym of the user’s friends) 
10:           Add k and its ID to set U2; 
11:    end if 
12: end for 
13: for any pseudonym k in U 
14:     if (k in U2) 
15:         Add the ID and (xk, yk) to result; 
16:     end if 
17: end for 
18: return result 
Fig.4 Algorithm for strangers’ location query in UDPLS 
5.  SECURITY ANALYSIS  
As we mentioned in previous sections, LS and SNS are 
both assumed to be “honest-but-curious”, and cannot 
collude. We need to prevent the LS to obtain the user’s social 
network, but also to prevent the SNS to obtain the user’s 
location information. Furthermore, the user’s friends and 
strangers who did not meet the conditions for access control 
cannot obtain the user’s location information. Therefore, 
security analysis is necessary for the following aspects. 
5.1 Privacy of User’s Identity 
Social network server manages user’s profiles and friend 
list, so we do not consider privacy of user’s identity on the 
social network server, only need to analyze that whether 
there is an issue of disclosing user’s identity on LS. While a 
user submits a query request, social network server will 
randomly generate a unique pseudonym for the user, even 
when the user changes his/her location.  
Assume the total number of users is n, then the probability 
to link users’ identity and pseudonym can be computed as: 
1/1UDPLSP n . 
where n is a large number, thus the probability of identity 
exposure is very small.  
In the MLS framework [11], pseudonym includes user’s 
real ID. Assume the length of pseudonym is l, and the length 
of user’s real ID is i (1≤ i < l). The probability that a user 
exposes his/her identity can be computed as: 
1/ ( 1)
MLS
1P l   
For example, we consider a case in which n = 500, and l 
=30, and it can be known that 1/n =1/500 < 1/29. Therefore, 
the probability of identifying a user’s identity in this paper is 
much smaller than that of MLS proposed in [11]. 
  
5.2 Privacy of Friends’ Information 
Social network server manages user’s friend list, so we do 
not consider privacy of user’s friend information on social 
network server, only need to analyze whether LS can obtain 
friends’ information of the user. In our framework, LS will 
send all pseudonyms meeting distance control and location 
information corresponding to the user. There may be no 
friends nor parts of friends in pseudonyms. 
Assume the number of pseudonyms is w, and then the 
probability to obtain friends’ information is as follows: 
2 1/ 2wUDPLSP  . 
We denote the probability to crash the secret key of RSA is 
p. The probability to get friends’ information in Ref. [11] can 
be computed as: 
2 max(1/ 2 , )
MLS
wP p ,      
where the function max(.,.) returns the maximum number of 
inputs. Obviously, 1/2w ≤ max(1/2w, p), i.e., the probability 
in our proposed solution is smaller than that of MLS [11]. 
5.3 Privacy of User’s Location  
The analysis above shows that the probability for LS to 
link user’s identity information and pseudonym is much 
small. Assume the total number of different location is k. 
Since pseudonym and location information are associated, it 
can be known that the probability for LS to infer user’s 
location information is the probability to obtain users’ 
identity or 1/k. Thus, we can see the probability for LS to 
infer user’s location can be calculated as: 
3 max(1/ ,1/ )UDPLSP k n . 
The probability to identify user’s location in [11] can be 
shown as: 
3 max(1/ ,1/ ( 1))
MLS
P k l  . 
Usually, n is larger than l-1, we can infer the probability in 
this paper is less than or equal to the probability in [11].  
We also mainly consider whether user’s location privacy 
on social network server has been secured. In our framework, 
user’s location information will be directly sent to LS, 
therefore, social networks cannot obtain any location 
information of user from LS. So for SNS, the probability to 
obtain user’s location can be demonstrated as: 
4 1/UDPLSP k , 
where k must be a larger number, which means the 
probability is negligibly small. 
And the probability in [11] can be computed as: 
4 max(1/ , )
MLS
P k p . 
Obviously, 1/k ≤ max(1/k, p), so we can get the 
conclusion that the probability to obtain user’s location in 
our framework is no greater than the probability in [11]. 
5.4 Social Network Privacy 
Since social network server manages user’s friend set, we 
do not consider social network privacy preserving on social 
network server. When a user updates his/her location, social 
network server will re-generate a pseudonym for the user.  
Assume the total number of users is n in LS. As analyzed 
above, LS can not sure which pseudonym is user’s friends, so 
the probability to infer user’s social network privacy can be 
calculated as: 
5 1/ 2nUDPLSP   
In practical applications, n may be a big number, so the 
probability is negligibly small. 
User’s friend set that randomly divided into multiple 
subsets are sent to multiple location servers in Ref. [11]. At 
the same time, each subset is added with some incorrect 
pseudonyms. We denote the total number of pseudonyms 
(include all friends’ pseudonyms and incorrect pseudonyms) 
is r and the number of friends in friend set is t. The 
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  . 
Usually, n is much larger than r and t. Considering a case 
in which n =5000, r =200, and t =150, we have that the 
probability in the solution proposed in this work is smaller 
than that in [11]. 
5.5 Authorized Access  
Two kinds of access control are included in this paper. 
One is distance control, the other is identity control. Distance 
control includes user-specified query distance and 
user-specified queried distance. Identity control allows user 
to specify a part of friends to share location with them or 
his/her ID to be queried. We have assumed that social 
network server and location server are “honest-but-curious”. 
“Honest” means location server and social network server 
execute query according to our designed framework and 
scheme. Therefore, user’s access control can be achieved. 
6.  SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For evaluating the effectiveness of our proposed UDPLS 
framework, we have conducted extensive simulations. In this 
section, we first describe the simulation environment, and 
then give the simulation results and analysis. 
6.1 Simulation Environment 
    We have implemented the proposed UDPLS and multiple 
location servers (MLS) framework in [11] by using C++ 
programming language in our simulations. For cryptographic 
functions, we employ the Crypto++ library (http://www. 
cryptopp.com/). We generate 7 scenarios for experiments as 
shown below in order to compare the performance of 
  
UDPLS with that of MLS. The simulations have been run on 
a 64-bit machine with 3.3GHz Intel CPU and 8 GB RAM. 
Scenario-1: The total number of users within query range 
is 10,000. The number of effective users change among 
0-9000, in which the number of friends is 0. The number of 
location servers is 1.  
Scenario-2: The total number of users within query range 
is 10,000. The number of effective users changes among 
0-9000, in which the number of friends is 40. The number of 
location servers is 1. 
Scenario-3: The total number of users within query range 
changes among 2000-16000. The number of effective users 
is 2000, in which the number of friends is 0. The number of 
location servers is 1. 
Scenario-4: The total number of users within query range 
changes among 2000-16000. The number of effective users 
is 2000, in which the number of friends is 10. The number of 
location servers is 1. 
Scenario-5: The total number of users is 6000 within 
query range. The number of effective users is 3000, in which 
the number of friends changes among 0-90. The number of 
location servers is 1.  
 Scenario-6: The total number of users is 6000 within 
query range. The number of effective users is 3000, in which 
the number of friends is 10. The number of location servers 
varies among 1-9.  
Scenario-7: The total number of users is 3000 within 
query range. The number of effective users is 70. The 
number of strangers in effective users varies among 0-30. 
The number of location servers is 1.  
Performance metrics. We measure the performance of our 
UDPLS and MLS framework [11] in terms of the query time, 
and the computation time of query on the client side, at 
location server and at social network server, respectively. We 
also measure registration time of users. 
6.2 Simulation Experiment Results 





























Fig.5 Simulation results on the query time under Scenario-1 
Figure 5 shows the simulation results on the query time for 
two compared methods under Scenario-1. From Figure 5, we 
can see that query time of our proposed UDPLS framework 
is shorter than that of MLS proposed in [11] for friends’ 
location query, when there are no friends. It worth noting that 
the query time does not include registration time. The query 
time of MLS fluctuates, this is because that the number of 
friends is 0 in the simulation environment and MLS 
construction will still generate a one-time key pair, which 
will cost some time uncertain. Therefore, the query time 
fluctuates within a certain range. The query time in UDPLS 
increases with the growth of the number of effective users. 
This is because that the time for matching friends’ identity 
and pseudonyms is proportional to the number of effective 
users. However, it just shows a slowly increasing since the 
proposed UDPLS algorithm is time efficient. 

































(a) Computation time consumed on client 






























(b) Computation time consumed on location server 




























     (c) Computation time consumed on social network server 
Fig.6 Simulation results on computation time under 
Scenario-1 
   From Figure 6(a), we can see that the computation time on 
client in UDPLS is 0. This is because that the number of 
friends in query distance is 0, so no time is needed to match 
user’s friend identity and pseudonyms. However, 
computation time on client in MLS framework fluctuates, 
which is consistent with our previous analysis. 
  
   Figure 6(b) shows that the computation time on location 
server in UDPLS system is shorter than that in MLS system. 
That is because that location server in MLS has to decrypt the 
user’s location information and find the user’s friends with 
user-defined distance, and thus consumes more time. 
   From Figure 6(c), we can see that the computation time on 
social network server in MLS framework is 0. Since nothing 
is needed to be computed on social network server in MLS. 
However, social network server has to find friends’ 
pseudonyms among effective users. Therefore, the 
computation time on social network in UDPLS shows slow 
growth with the increasing of the number of effective users. 



























Fig.7 The effective users including 40 friends 

































(a) Computation time consumed on client 





























(b) Computation time consumed on location server 































(c) Computation time consumed on social network server 
Fig.8 The simulation results under Scenario-2 
Figure 7 shows the simulation results on the query time for 
two compared methods under Scenario-2. It is clear that the 
query time of MLS is much higher than that of UDPLS. The 
query time of MLS fluctuates between 180ms-250ms, and 
there is no significant increase or decrease trend. The query 
time of UDPLS shows a slow growth. Figure 7 is similar to 
Figure 5, because just the number of friends is different in 
these two scenarios. 
From Figure 8(a), we can see that computation time on 
client in MLS system is much higher than UDPLS system. 
This is because friends’ location information has to be 
decrypted by the user, which means that more computation 
time on client is needed. The computation time on client in 
UDPLS is very short and shows slow growth. Since the user 
has to match friends’ identities and pseudonym. Figure 8(b) 
shows that the computation time on location server is almost 
stable in both MLS and UDPLS. That means computation on 
location almost has no business with the number of effective 
users. Figure 8(c) demonstrates that the computation time on 
social network in MLS framework is 0, and the computation 
time on social network in UDPLS framework is growing 
linearly that is similar to Figure 6(c). 





























Fig.9 The total number of users including 0 friends versus 
the query time  
Figure 9 shows the simulation results on the query time for 
two compared methods under Scenario-3. From Figure 9, we 
can see that the query time in UDPLS system is shorter than 
that in MLS system. Furthermore, the query time in MLS 
framework fluctuates among 40-60ms, and the query time in 
UDPLS framework shows a slight growth. 
  
From Figure 10(a), we can see that the computation time 
on client in MLS system fluctuates among 20-50ms. 
However, the computation time on client in UDPLS 
framework is 0. The reason is similar with the description for 
Figure 6(a). Figure 10(b) shows that computation times on 
location server in SML system and UDPLS system are both 
increased with the growth of the total number of users. This 
is because more time is needed to find effective users from 
total users. Furthermore, from Figure 10(c), we can see that 
the computation time on social network in UDPLS is stable, 
and computation time on social network in MLS is 0. The 
reason is that the computation time on social network server 
almost has no business with the total number of users when 
the number of effective users is constant. 




























(a) Computation time on client 






























(b) Computation time on location server 



































      (c) Computation time on social network server 
     Fig.10 The simulation results for Scenario-3 





























Fig.11 The total number of users including 10 friends 
   Figure 11 shows the simulation results on the query time 
for two compared methods under Scenario-4. We can see 
that the Figure 11 is similar to the Figure 9, but the difference 
between the query time in MLS framework and UDPLS 
framework is bigger, since the number of friends is increased 
to 10. 
   Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 8, we can see they are 
similar in a large extent, but the computation time difference 
is larger in Scenario-4. Thus, we can conclude that the 
number of friends is an important factor which will affect the 
query time in MLS system. However, the query time in 
UDPLS framework almost has no business with the number 
of friends. 




























(a) Computation time on client 































 (b) Computation time on location server 
  






























(c) Computation time on social network server 
Fig.12 The simulation results for Scenario-4 





























Fig.13 The number of friends versus the query time  
  Figure 13 shows the simulation results on the query time for 
two compared frameworks under Scenario-5. From Figure 
13, we can see that the query time in MLS system increased 
with the growth of the number of friends. However, the query 
time in UDPLS system still keeps stable and is much shorter 
than that in MLS system. In addition, the query time 
difference is increased with the growth of the number of 
friends. From the point of the query time, there is a distinct 
advantage in UDPLS system compared with MLS system. 
This is because the more number of friends means that more 
time of encryption and decryption is needed in MLS 
framework.  




























(a) Computation time on client 





























(b) Computation time on location server 






























(c) Computation time on social network server 
Fig.14 The simulation results for Scenario-5 
   From Figure 14(a), we can see that computation time on 
client is growing with the increasing of the number of friends. 
The reason is that friends’ location information is decrypted 
on client. However, the query time of our proposed system is 
stable and much little. Figure 14(b) shows that computation 
time on location server in MLS system is also growing with 
the increasing of the number of friends. The computation 
time on location server in UDPLS framework is stable and 
much less than MLS framework. From Figure 14(c), we can 
see that computation time on social network server is 0, 
which is similar to results shown before. This is because that 
the number of location server is 1, so user’s friend list does 
not need to be divided. Thus, social network server has 
nothing to compute. Computation time on social network 
server in UDPLS system fluctuates among 10-35ms. 



























Fig.15 The number of location servers versus the query time 
   The Figure 15 shows the simulation results on the query 
time for two compared methods under Scenario-6. Assume 
that the number of the user’s friends in friends list is 100, and 
the 10 friends satisfying access policy are evenly distributed 
to multiple location servers. We select maximum encryption 
time on multiple location servers as encryption time instead 
of the sum of encryption time on location server. 
   We can see that the query time in MLS system fluctuates 
among 60-110ms. The query time in UDPLS system is stable 
and much less than in MLS system. The 10 friends are evenly 
distributed to multiple location servers, which means the 
contents having to be encrypted are distributed. However, the 
query time in MLS framework does not show a downward 
trend. This is because that the decrease of encryption time is 
not enough to affect the trend of query time. Thus, the 
number of location servers is not a key factor for reducing the 
query time in MLS system. In addition, our proposed system 
  
does not involve division of friend list, so it has no business 
with the number of location servers. 





























Fig.16 The number of strangers versus the query time 
    Figure 16 shows the simulation results on the query time 
for two compared frameworks under Scenario-7. From Fig. 
16 we can see that the query time of UDPLS is much shorter 
than that of MLS. It is clear that query time of MLS 
fluctuates when the number of strangers is among 0-10, but 
the query time shows an upward trend when the number of 
strangers is among 10-25. This is because that when the 
number of strangers is not enough, the query time is greatly 
affected by the generation time of key pair. However, when 
the number of strangers is enough, the greater the number of 
strangers, the more time of encryption and decryption 
consumed. The query time is much short and stabilized in 
UDPLS, since the numbers of effective users and strangers 
are few and thus matching calculation is quick. 

































Fig.17 User’s registration time at both LS and SNS 
   We also show the simulation results of registration time 
when the user registered at different time, shown in Figure 17. 
Registration time in MLS is less than that in UDPLS, and 
registration time difference between UDPLS and MLS is 
30ms-40ms. However as shown before, it is smaller 
compared with the query time difference. 
Furthermore, we conduct extensive simulations in order to 
prove the correctness and feasibility of our proposed solution. 
We present a large number of simulation results in the 
following tables. In this set of simulations, we assume that 
the information can correctly transmit among location server, 
social network server, and users, and the response time is 
limited at 300ms. Table 2 shows the result of friends’ 
location query when a user shares his/her location with all of 
his/her friends. Table 3 gives the result of friends’ location 
query when a user shares his/her location with part of his/her 
friends specified by the user. Table 4 displays the results of 
strangers’ location query. 
Table 2 Results for sharing with all friends 
Number of friends 700 800 900 1000 1100 
Number of queried 
friends 
700 800 900 953 1002 
Number of error 
IDs or locations 
0 0 0 0 0 
Accuracy ratio 100% 100% 100% 95% 91% 
Table 3 Results for sharing with parts of friends 
Number of friends 
specified by user 
700 800 900 1000 1100 
Number of queried 
friends 
700 800 900 921 936 
Number of error 
IDs or locations 
0 0 0 0 0 
Accuracy ratio 100% 100% 100% 92% 85% 
Table 4 Results on strangers’ location query 
Number of 
strangers 
700 800 900 1000 1100 
Number of queried 
strangers 
700 800 900 962 986 
Number of error 
IDs or locations 
0 0 0 0 0 
Accuracy ratio 100% 100% 100% 96% 89% 
As shown in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4, the solution we 
proposed has good effectiveness when users perform friends’ 
location query or strangers’ location query. We can see the 
accuracy ratio is very high even under a large-scale scenario. 
It should be noted that if the response time were set up to 
1000ms, the accuracy ratio would rise to 100%. 
7. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We propose a new solution to achieve user-defined 
location privacy and social network privacy. Social network 
server is prevented from obtaining users’ location 
information, and location server cannot get users’ social 
network information in our proposed solution. Moreover, 
users’ location information cannot be accessed by people 
who does not match their access control. Our main research 
contributions are described as follows. 
 We design an efficient algorithm to preserve user’s 
location privacy and network privacy on location server, 
and preserve user’s location privacy on social network 
server. Our proposed algorithm is suitable for both 
friends’ and strangers’ location queries, and not leak 
user’s location information on location servers. 
 For preserving privacy, we construct a novel system 
model which needs only one location server to execute 
friends’ location queries and strangers’ location queries. 
 Considering that the user may not trust all of his friends, 
our proposed system model allows the user share his/her 
location with a part of his friends.  
  
 We evaluate our algorithm by conducting extensive 
simulations under various scenarios. Simulation results 
show that our proposed algorithm incurs a lower time 
complexity than existing approaches. 
However, for protect user’s location privacy and social 
network privacy, when the user query friends’ or strangers’ 
location, all pseudonyms and their location information that 
match their access control will be sent to the user by location 
server, which will result in additional traffic overhead. 
Moreover, when users change their location, their identities 
will be certified by location server and the time consumption 
cannot be ignored. 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we study the problem of protecting users’ 
privacy in location sharing services, such as nearby friends 
query and strangers query. We propose a new framework and 
a new query algorithm (UDPLS) to protect user’s location 
privacy on social network server and user’s social network 
privacy on location privacy. Users can share location with 
specified-friends instead of all of his friends. It is noteworthy 
that query time of our framework almost has no business 
with the number of fiends in friend query. We match 
pseudonym of user’s friends and ID in the user terminals. We 
conduct extensive simulation experiments to evaluate the 
performance of our system and algorithm. The simulation 
results show that the proposed algorithm outperforms the 
existing approach. 
The solution proposed in this work will result in additional 
traffic overhead, our future work is to reduce the traffic 
overhead without compromising users’ privacy. 
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